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ABSTRACT 
 
Medical devices that utilize computer software are becoming common place in today’s health 
care environment. Device failures can have life threatening consequences. The medical device 
approval process issued by the FDA should enhance the software testing requirements. In this 
paper we suggest that Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FEMA) should be a standard component in 
the testing of software in medical devices that can have life threatening consequences.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is an increasing trend toward more automation across all domains, from traffic control and 
the manufacturing realm to aviation management and medical devices. In a sense, systems are 
becoming more intelligent and require less human intervention. Humans are increasingly 
becoming more reliant on these intelligent systems to manage both mundane and sophisticated 
functions in life. Intelligent systems have helped humans immensely in critical functions such as 
in aviation: more embedded systems have been added to automate operations in the cockpit, 
which have been proven to be beneficial in many ways such as reducing the stress and fatigue 
that pilots have to endure on longer trips. Additionally, auto-pilot functionality has also been 
proven to be better than human pilots at making critical decisions under severe circumstances. 
Intuitively, computers are better at producing consistent and objective results, whereas humans 
may be tempted to trust their “gut feelings” when put under pressure.  
 
Medical devices that utilize computer software are becoming common place in today’s health 
care, ranging from insulin pumps, to devices that dispense drugs, and those that monitor heart 
rhythms. Many medical devices have been used successfully to provide better patient care, often 
with costs savings, and in most situations actually address some areas of human driven errors 
(Berman, 2004). 
 
At the same time software to program and/or control medical devices can, and have, introduced 
errors that affect patient outcomes. The errors are in part due to the hardware, the software, or a 
failure of the interface between the hardware and software in the medical device and the person 
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using the device. In critical systems like these, where failures may result in substantial losses, a 
more rigorous safety standard is expected of the system software. More and better testing 
requirements and processes should ensure that more errors are identified before medical device 
products are approved and released. 
 
The FDA has an approval process for medical devices with differences depending on the 
criticality level of the application of the medical devices. The testing requirements are not clearly 
specified in the FDA medical device approval process. In previous research we suggested that 
human computer interaction testing can improve device quality and user experience (Nindel-
Edwards & Steinke, 2009). While human computer interaction testing is helpful and necessary, it 
is usually conducted late in the development process. Addressing test findings is often resisted 
because of the expense and timing concerns for fixing a product so late in the development cycle. 
In this paper we suggest Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) will catch serious errors and 
problems earlier on in the system development process—and should be part of the process before 
medical devices are approved by the FDA. 
 
 
MEDICAL DEVICE FAILURES 
 
A few examples of problems with the human computer interface of medical devices will provide 
some background for this paper. 
 
The Therac-25 device was developed to provide radiation to cancer patients. The presence of 
numerous flaws in the software led to massive radiation overdoses, resulting in the deaths of 
three people (Leveson, 1993). It was poor user interface controls that caused prescription and 
dose rate information to be entered improperly (McQuaid, 2009). 
 
A problem with a flow control knob is cited by the FDA (Sawyer, 1996): "A physician treating a 
patient with oxygen set the flow control knob between 1 and 2 liters per minute, not realizing 
that the scale numbers represented discrete rather than continuous, settings. There was no oxygen 
flow between the settings, yet the knob rotated smoothly, suggesting that intermediate settings 
were possible. The patient, an infant, became hypoxic before the error was discovered. Testing of 
this device should have identified this problem."  
 
A volumetric infusion pump is a medical device that delivers intravenous fluids and medicine to 
patients. The Baxter Colleague triple channel infusion pump generates fault codes under the 
condition of changing a fluid supply at the same time the supply goes to zero (an understandable 
& appropriate behavior). Unfortunately this fault also stopped the other two channels from 
continuing to operate, causing a life threatening situation for patients. At least 9 patients’ deaths 
have been attributed to miscommunication between the care giver and the software that runs 
these medical devices (Infusion Pump Recall, 2009). 
 
The Journal of the American Medical Association (Koppel et al., 2005) reported on an 
examination of a hospital computer system and suggested that computers increased the error risk. 
They said, “…the problem is that hospital computer systems are not designed for the way real-
life hospitals work.” It appears that their recommendation is for more testing. 
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Further examples can be found in an article published by Dick Sawyer (1996). The complexity of 
technology and software is growing: The deployment of medical devices to the field such that 
"Caregivers and clinical engineers ... are becoming lost in a swirl of technology, and [we] face 
unanticipated interference between devices." (Lee and Pappas, 2006). It is clear that some 
medical devices have failed, at least in part due to the software in the devices. 
 
 
FDA STANDARDS FOR TESTING MEDICAL DEVICES 
 
The Federal Drug Administration has established standards for medical devices and classifies 
these based on criticality levels of the device usage, ranging from Class I (least critical) to Class 
III (life support/life sustaining) (FDA, 2006a):  
 
• Class I – Devices used in non-life sustaining tasks, subject only to “General 
Controls”. 
• Class II – Also non-life sustaining, but subject to both “General Controls” and 
“Special Controls” (FDA, 2006b). 
• Class III – Devices that sustain or support life, subject to both types of controls and 
may not be introduced to market without FDA oversight and pre-approval requiring 
in many cases clinical trials. 
 
Class III medical devices require the most scrutiny, and accordingly are the devices that cost the 
most to develop, test, and support. It is interesting to note that Class II devices can, and are, 
applied in situations where if not used, or tested appropriately, can result in serious injury and 
possible patient mortality. And yet the approval process for Class II is significantly reduced from 
Class III devices. Also, from the FDA perspective, it seems that the difference between hardware 
and computer controls with associated software is not material. The devices are simply classified 
as I, II, or III, based on usage. Perhaps the testing could also be based on the complexity of the 
device and the associated software—the more complex, the more testing should be required. 
 
 
FDA RECOMMENDATION FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
 
There are software standards published by the FDA in 2002 that provide guidelines and 
requirements for the software used in medical devices, regardless of class (Quality System 
Regulation, 2006). Various FDA documents specify that the “general controls” associated with 
software in medical devices follow existing standards for requirement driven software projects, 
e.g. the classic waterfall model overlaid by a risk based analysis termed “Level of Concern”. 
This is summarized in the Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software 
Contained in Medical Devices documented in the following decision matrix (FDA, 2006a): 
 
The criticality of devices is divided into three classes: Class I, II and III. The software is divided 
into three areas as well: Minor Concern, Moderate Concern and Major Concern. There is some 
relationship between the two. That is to say that a medical device could be a class III (highest 
standards) yet the software associated with the device be only a "minor concern" if the software 
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component was actually peripheral to the Class III rating. This in fact was the situation with the 
first model of the Therac as the hardware provided the protection and the associated software 
was of "moderate concern". When the hardware interlock was removed the software moved from 
"moderate" to "major" without the appropriate review of the software component.  
 
Software Documentation Minor Concern Moderate Concern Major Concern 
Level of Concern A statement indicating the Level of Concern and a description of the 
rationale for that level. 
Software Description A summary overview of the features and software operating 
environment. 
Device Hazard Analysis Tabular description of identified hardware and software hazards, 
including severity assessment and mitigations. 
Software Requirements 
Specification (SRS) 
Summary of 
functional 
requirements from 
SRS. 
The complete SRS document. 
Architecture Design 
Chart 
No documentation is 
necessary in the 
submission.  
Detailed depiction of functional units and 
software modules. May include state 
diagrams as well as flow charts.  
Software Design 
Specification (SDS)  
No documentation is 
necessary in the 
submission. 
Software design specification document. 
Traceability Analysis Traceability among requirements, specifications, identified hazards 
and mitigations, and Verification and Validation testing. 
Software Development 
Environment Description 
No documentation is 
necessary in the 
submission. 
Summary of software 
life cycle development 
plan, including a 
summary of the 
configuration 
management and 
maintenance activities. 
Summary of 
software life cycle 
development plan. 
Annotated list of 
control documents 
generated during 
development 
process. Include the 
configuration 
management and 
maintenance plan 
documents. 
Verification and 
Validation 
Documentation 
Software functional 
test plan, pass / fail 
criteria, and results. 
Description of V&V 
activities at the unit, 
integration, and 
system level. System 
level test protocol, 
including pass/fail 
Description of V&V 
activities at the unit, 
integration, and 
system level. Unit, 
integration and 
system level test 
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criteria, and tests 
results. 
protocols, including 
pass/fail criteria, test 
report, summary, 
and tests results. 
Revision Level History Revision history log, including release version number and date. 
Unresolved Anomalies 
(Bugs or Defects) 
No documentation is 
necessary in the 
submission. 
List of remaining software anomalies, 
annotated with an explanation of the impact 
on safety or effectiveness, including operator 
usage and human factors. 
 
The key reports associated with the FDA specifications are listed in the first column above:  
 
• Software Requirements Specification (SRS),  
• Architecture Design Chart,  
• Software Design Specification (SDS),  
• Traceability Analysis,  
• Software Development Environment Description,  
• Verification and Validation Documentation,  
• Revision Level History, and  
• Defect Reports. 
 
The key deliverable is the Verification and Validation (aka V&V) documentation. While a 
common term in the software industry, we’ll reflect here on the FDA’s definition (FDA, 2002): 
• Software verification provides objective evidence that the design outputs of a 
particular phase of the software development life cycle meet all of the specified 
requirements for that phase. Software verification looks for consistency, 
completeness, and correctness of the software and its supporting documentation, as it 
is being developed, and provides support for a subsequent conclusion that software is 
validated. Software testing is one of many verification activities intended to confirm 
that software development output meets its input requirements. Other verification 
activities include various static and dynamic analyses, code and document 
inspections, walkthroughs, and other techniques. 
• Software validation is a part of the design validation for a finished device, but is not 
separately defined in the Quality System regulation. The FDA considers software 
validation to be "confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence 
that software specifications conform to user needs and intended uses, and that the 
particular requirements implemented through software can be consistently fulfilled." 
In practice, software validation activities may occur both during, as well as at the end 
of the software development life cycle to ensure that all requirements have been 
fulfilled. Since software is usually part of a larger hardware system, the validation of 
software typically includes evidence that all software requirements have been 
implemented correctly and completely, and are traceable to system requirements. A 
conclusion that software is validated is highly dependent upon comprehensive 
software testing, inspections, analyses, and other verification tasks performed at each 
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stage of the software development life cycle. Testing of device software functionality 
in a simulated use environment, and user site testing are typically included as 
components of an overall design validation program for a software automated device. 
 
An interesting point here is the statement “that software specifications conform to user needs and 
intended uses”. This assumes that the Software Requirements Specifications (SRS) in and of 
itself is correct, and Verification and Validation (V&V) assures the device software matches the 
specifications. What if the SRS itself is flawed in one or more areas? The very best we can say is 
that we’ve assured (through the V&V process) that the software perform well to the requirements 
(SRS) without highlighting the underlying flaw in the SRS. 
 
So we have two areas to examine that are not included in the FDA requirement: 
 
• Are the requirements indeed accurate and complete? 
• Has the system been designed appropriately to achieve the requirements? 
 
The software quality assurance perspective is to “drive quality upstream” by verifying the 
correctness of the requirements, in this instance the SRS and Software Design Specification 
(SDS). It is especially in answering the second question that FMEA can be very helpful. Then 
the Verification and Validation process can assure that the system meets the requirements. 
 
 
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
 
To find design and conceptual software faults, a Quality Engineering methodology called Failure 
Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) can be utilized. We can answer the question: Has the system been 
appropriately designed to achieve the requirements? Conceptual software faults, or the inherent 
defects in the logic of the software models, are usually not components of standard testing 
methodologies. That is why FMEA is so beneficial. 
 
FMEA proactively sets out to find out what exactly can go wrong, the cost of such failures, and 
the cost to mitigate these failures. At the heart of FMEA is the process of re-evaluating a 
preliminary design with the conscious mind that the design is flawed. 
 
FMEA is a very simple tool, but what makes this tool very powerful is the fact that it 
incorporates multiple viewpoints into system design. Fred Brooks (1982) in his best-seller, The 
Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering, describes an integrity goal as 
“[dictating] that the design must proceed from one mind or from a very small number of agreeing 
resonant minds.” FMEA provides a framework for more people with different backgrounds, a 
design committee, to do exactly that. The goal is that those who are involved in this analysis are 
not new to the field – they have probably designed similar systems in the past. Consequently, 
they should be able to point out what components of the system are most likely to fail and what 
components are most likely to inflict the most damage if they fail. FMEA is successful only if 
the design committee is composed of experts from different functional groups that are committed 
in the design process and have enough authority to make the decision or outcome stick. 
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Unlike other risk management tools that often require statistical savvy, FMEA is relatively 
intuitive. It is often described as a design tool, because the idea is to correct the conceptual faults 
of the system or product – or in other words, to correct the defects before they are created. 
 
According to Peter L. Goddard there can be two types of software FMEA: system-level software 
FMEA and detailed software FMEA. He describes the system-level software FMEA as being 
“based on the top level software design: the functional partitioning of the software design into … 
modules.” (Goddard, 2000) This system-level software FMEA is an ongoing guideline that 
controls the risk of defects through product or process design requirements. 
 
The detailed software FMEA is introduced later in the design process, “once at least pseudo code 
for the software modules is available.” (Goddard, 2000) Detailed software FMEA is a testing 
tool that checks the validity of the risk mitigation mechanisms introduced earlier in the process 
by the system-level software FMEA. 
 
Goddard recommends a process for developing a FMEA. First software hazards or problem areas 
must be identified. Being logical entities (as opposed to physical entities), hazards must be 
identified and translated into software terms prior to the analysis. After a list of all potential 
hazards is created, Goddard suggests performing a fault tree analysis to investigate the potential 
causes of hazards. The end results of the fault tree analysis should be a value set associated with 
each hazard cause, which is then identified as a software hazard. 
 
The next step in FMEA is to assign a numerical rating of 1 through 10 for the following 
variables, which are listed in descending order of importance, to each of the software hazards:  
 
1. Severity. A rating of 1 in severity indicates an insignificant damage and a rating of 10 
indicates a catastrophic outcome resulting from the hazard. 
2. Occurrence. A rating of 1 in occurrence indicates a hazard that is unlikely to happen 
and a rating of 10 indicates a hazard that inevitably will happen. 
3. Detection. A rating of 1 in detection indicates that occurrence of a particular hazard is 
detectable (i.e. the hazard will be visible before the damage is done) and a rating of 
10 indicates that no control exists to detect such occurrence (i.e. the damage will be 
visible once damage is done). 
 
These variables are then multiplied together to produce a Risk Priority Number (RPN). Based on 
these assigned RPN’s, the FMEA committee is then aided in the decision to select what hazards 
to focus their design fixes/mitigation planning on. 
 
Part of what makes FMEA a successful risk mitigation tool is that it is a structured process for 
identifying areas of concern. It helps document, plan and track risk reduction activities 
proactively – thus reducing costs of fixing defects later. More importantly, FMEA is a group 
effort, which means the action plans that result from FMEA reflects the commitment and 
ownership of a cross-functional group of people (i.e. “all necks in the noose”). 
 
FMEA ultimately provides the documentation that the design committee has done their due 
diligence in re-evaluating the conceptual integrity of their design. Additionally, it can also serve 
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as a proof of evidence-based decision making. A well-constructed FMEA worksheet can show 
the logical reasoning behind why mitigation plans are focused on a particular area of the 
software system. 
 
FMEA has been recommended for evaluating critical systems in various industries and 
standards, including: SAE J1739, ARP 5580, ISO 9001:2000, MIL STD 1629A, MIL STD 882, 
IEC 61508 (Goddard, 2000). FMEA is not a substitute for rigorous testing mechanisms that 
check for completeness and accuracy of the systems, but it can be a powerful tool to improve 
quality, reliability and safety of a process or product. 
 
Therefore, the recommendation that FMEA should be a part of the FDA testing requirements for 
medical devices that impact lives is important. The use of a cross-functional group to evaluate 
the design is especially appropriate. Medical devices put a heavy responsibility on the design 
team responsible for the development and implementation of medical devices. The medical 
device design teams is not are not licensed care givers but computer hardware, and software 
developers. Theirs is the job of both discerning not only the requirements and anticipated uses of 
medical devices, but the potential for boundary, outlier, and simply misuse of these devices. It is 
worthwhile to repeat Marc Green’s (n.d.) comment: “Faulty design could be construed as 
negligence on the part of the designers.” 
 
The goal of FMEA is to verify at the start of the design phase the components of the system that 
are most likely to fail and what components are most likely to inflict the most damage. 
Concentrating on what, and how, a critical heath care application is intended to respond is 
certainly a factor in the design, development and delivery of functionality. FMEA and its 
associated testing of medical device design and performance can assure that the device delivers 
its critical care under the anticipated circumstances and continues to delivers critical care when 
circumstances are less than ideal. Any of us can suggest that if events had only gone as we 
expected them to unfold, everything would "be ok". FMEA provides for an evaluation of the 
most serious failures and hazards. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
FMEA is being successfully used in many commercial settings to develop better products. 
Similar to critical software components in the aviation and automotive industry, FMEA can help 
in evaluating critical components of medical devices. The FDA should require medical devices 
manufacturers to use FMEA during the development of medical devices. 
 
A challenge for the FDA as well as a medical device manufacturer is the question: What is 
appropriate and sufficient testing? How much testing is enough? Often it is impossible to test all 
possible conditions and situations. Certainly the testing should relate to the FDA’s definition of 
Class I, II and III devices. Perhaps there should also be some factor as to the complexity of the 
software in a particular device, with more complex software functions calling for more testing. 
We would also suggest that an independent organization verify the testing performed by the 
manufacturer and provide some level of certification as to the testing that has been performed. 
Further research is necessary to determine certification levels and their relationship to the 
criticality levels of the medical devices. 
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